In this paper, we consider the problem of polar coding for secure communications over the two-way wiretap channel, where two legitimate users communicate with each other simultaneously, while a passive eavesdropper overhears a combination of their exchanged signals. We design a low complexity polar coded cooperative jamming scheme that achieves the whole secrecy rate region of the general two-way wiretap channel under the strong secrecy criterion. The chaining method is used to make proper alignment of polar indices. The randomness required to be shared between two legitimate users is treated as a limited resource and we show that its rate can be made negligible by increasing the blocklength and the number of chained blocks. For the special case when the eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to the legitimate ones, a simplified scheme is proposed which can simultaneously ensure reliability and weak secrecy within a single transmission block.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner proved in [1] that it is possible to communicate both reliably and securely over a wiretap channel, on the premise that the eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to the legitimate channel. Since then, numerous works have been done on showing the existence of secure coding schemes for different kinds of channels. However, few of these results provide guidance for designing a specific polynomial-time coding scheme, except for some special cases [2] - [4] . Polar codes, proposed by Arıkan [5] , have demonstrated capacityachieving property in both source and channel coding [5] - [9] . The principle that lies behind polar codes is that one can generate a series of extremal channels (noiseless or purely noisy) from repeated uses of a single-user channel. The structure of polar codes makes them also suitable for designing secrecy codes. Polar coding has been studied for wiretap channels [10] - [17] , fading wiretap channels [18] , multiple access wiretap channels [19] , [20] , and broadcast channels with confidential messages [16] , [17] . It is shown that polar codes can achieve the secrecy capacity of the general wiretap channel under the strong secrecy criterion [16] , [17] .
The two-way wiretap channel models the situation when two legitimate users communicate with each other simultaneously in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. In this model, signals overheard by the eavesdropper are combinations of the exchanged signals between two legitimate users. This motivates the idea of leveraging interference between two users' transmitted codewords to degrade the eavesdropper channel, known as coded cooperative jamming. This problem was first investigated in [21] , and the achievable rate region for the two-way wiretap channel was derived in [22] and [23] . A practical scheme based on low-density parity-check (LDPC) code was presented in [24] , which can guarantee weak secrecy for the special case of binary-input Gaussian two-way wiretap channel with equal-gained interference. However, this scheme may not be extended to more complicated cases and cannot achieve optimal secrecy rate region. Other related works on coded cooperative jamming include polar coding for multiple access wiretap channels in [19] and [20] . However, this channel is still a one-way channel with no self interference at the senders, thus the design is relatively simpler. Besides, [20] only considered the symmetric channel case and cannot achieve the whole secrecy rate region.
Note that the eavesdropper sees a 2-user multiple access channel (MAC) in the two-way wiretap channel. Polar coding for MACs has been studied in [25] - [30] . There are two types of MAC polarization methods in the literature, either synthesizing N uses of the original MAC into N new extremal MACs [25] - [27] , or 2N extremal point-to-point channels [28] - [30] . In our scheme, we adopt Arıkan's monotone chain rule expansion method [28] which belongs to the first type, as it can achieve all points on the dominant face of the achievable rate region of a MAC directly without time sharing or rate splitting, and has simple structure and low encoding/decoding complexity.
In this paper, we use polar codes to design a coded cooperative jamming scheme for the general two-way wiretap channel. The chaining method [31] is used to deal with unaligned polar indices in the general channel case. The main contributions of this paper include:
• We propose a low-complexity polar coded cooperative jamming scheme for the general two-way wiretap channel, without any constraint on channel symmetry or degradation. Self interference of each user is considered in the code design, making our proposed scheme suitable for a large variety of channels rather than additive ones. For additive channels, one may assume that each user's self interference can be perfectly canceled. However, under a general setting, this assumption is inappropriate. In this paper, we treat self interference as side information of the legitimate channels, which is involved in the polar code design, encoding and decoding.
• We prove that our proposed scheme can achieve all points on the dominant face of the secrecy rate region of the two-way wiretap channel under the strong secrecy criterion. The monotone chain rule expansion based MAC polarization is applied on the eavesdropper channel to allocate secrecy rates between the two legitimate users. Note that we do not assume how the eavesdropper decodes by using a specific monotone chain rule expansion. Secrecy is always guaranteed with any choice of the expansion.
• We consider the amount of randomness required to be shared between the legitimate users as a limited resource, and show that its rate can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the blocklength and chaining sufficient number of blocks in our scheme.
• We provide a single-block scheme for the special case of degraded two-way wiretap channel which can guarantee weak secrecy. In the case when the eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to both legitimate channels, we show that with a slight modification, our proposed scheme can achieve the secrecy rate region of the two-way wiretap channel under the weak secrecy criterion within a single transmission block.
• We show an example of the binary erasure two-way wiretap channel to demonstrate the performance of our proposed scheme, which can provide some guidance in practical designs. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the two-way wiretap channel model and state the problem we investigate. In Section III we provide some necessary background on polarization and polar codes. We describe details of our proposed polar coding scheme and analyze its performance in Section IV. A special case when weak secrecy can be obtained within a single transmission block is shown in Section V. Section VI gives an example of the binary erasure two-way wiretap channel. We conclude this paper in Section VII.
Notation: [N ] denotes the index set of {1, 2, . . . , N }. Random variables are denoted by capital letters X , Y , U , V , . . . with values x, y, u, v, . . . respectively. For a vector y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . y N ), y i:j denotes its subvector (y i , . . . , y j ), and y A (A ⊂ [N ]) denotes its subvector {y i : i ∈ A}. F ⊗n denotes the n th Kronecker power of F. G N = B N F ⊗n is the generator matrix of polar codes [5] , where N = 2 n is the code length with n being an arbitrary integer, B N is a permutation matrix known as bit-reversal matrix, and F = 1 0 1 1 . δ N = 2 −N β for some β ∈ (0, 1/2). 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT A. CHANNEL MODEL
We consider the secure communication problem in the twoway wiretap channel as illustrated in Fig. 1 . In this model, each of the two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, is equipped with a transmitter and a receiver. The channel is assumed to be full-duplex, and the two users communicate with each other simultaneously under the existence of a passive eavesdropper, Eve. Details of the communications are as follows:
• Alice wants to send a message M 1 to Bob at rate R 1 over N channel uses, she encodes M 1 into a codeword X 1 and transmits it through the channel;
• Bob wants to send a message M 2 to Alice at rate R 2 also over N channel uses, he encodes M 2 into a codeword X 2 and transmits it through the channel;
• Alice observes Y 2 from the channel and recoversM 2 ;
• Bob observes Y 1 from the channel and recoversM 1 ; • Eve observes Y e . Definition 1: A memoryless two-way wiretap channel
alphabets X 1 and X 2 , three output alphabets Y 1 , Y 2 and Y e , and transition probability P
The multiple access nature of the eavesdropper channel renders Alice and Bob an advantage over Eve, since the combination of their signals may have a detrimental effect on her.
In the multi-user communication scenario, a natural approach to enhance security is to use cooperative jamming [21] . While one user is transmitting secret messages, the other user transmits artificial noise to reduce the eavesdropper's signalto-noise ratio. In such a scheme, only one user can transmit useful information at a time. Another approach which overcomes this limitation is to utilize interference between codewords to jam the eavesdropper. In this case, both users transmit secret messages simultaneously, and their codewords are elaborately designed so that the interference between them can confuse the eavesdropper. This scheme is called coded cooperative jamming [21] . In this paper, we use polar codes to design such a scheme. The goal of designing a secure coding scheme for the two-way wiretap channel is to make sure Eve obtains no (or vanishing) information about M 1 and M 2 from Y e , while Alice and Bob can estimate their intended massages correctly. The performance of a coding scheme is assessed by its reliability and secrecy. For a coding scheme of blocklength N , reliability is measured by the probability of error
Secrecy can be measured by the information leakage
or the information leakage rate
The objective of a secure coding scheme is then: 
Criterion (6) is called weak secrecy because it does not guarantee vanishing information leakage. For some strict situations this is unacceptable. In Section IV we will introduce the general strong secrecy scheme. In Section V we discuss a special case when weak secrecy can be achieved within a single transmission block.
C. ACHIEVABLE RATE REGION
A rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable for a two-way wiretap channel under the strong/weak secrecy criterion if there exists a coding scheme such that (4) and (5)/(6) can be satisfied. The achievable rate region of this channel is the closure of all achievable rate pairs. For a two-way wiretap channel with transition probability P Y 1 Y 2 Y e |X 1 X 2 (y 1 , y 2 , y e |x 1 , x 2 ), the secrecy rate region under the strong (as well as weak) secrecy criterion is [22] 
where
with C 1 and C 2 being two auxiliary random variables, and
III. REVIEW OF POLAR CODING A. POLAR CODING FOR ASYMMETRIC CHANNELS
In this subsection we review the polar coding scheme proposed in [9] and simplified in [16] and [32] 1 for asymmetric channels. Consider N independent uses of a binary-input discrete memoryless channel (B-DMC) P Y |X (y|x), where X is binary with arbitrary distribution and Y is defined on an arbitrary countable alphabet. Let U 1:N = X 1:N G N . Define the following polarized sets:
L (N )
It is shown that [6] lim N →∞
To estimate the polarized sets for a channel, one may use the density evolution method of [33] , or the approximation method of [34] . To construct a polar code for W , partition indices of U 1:N into the following sets:
Letũ 1:N be a realization of U 1:N in the encoding scheme.
Since {ũ i } i∈I are uniformly distributed and can be reliably decoded, these positions can be filled with uniformly distributed information bits. For {ũ i } i∈F ∪D , [9] suggests to assign them by random mappings λ I c {λ i } i∈I c that sample distribution P U i |U 1:i−1 , which are shared between the encoder and the decoder. However, Exchanging the shared randomness may heavily increase the encoder's overhead since the non-information bits usually form a large portion of the uncoded bits. A simplified scheme which only requires a vanishing rate of shared randomness was proposed in [32] and used in [16] , which is summarized as follows.
• {ũ i
} i∈I carry uniformly distributed information bits, • {ũ i } i∈F are filled with uniformly distributed frozen bits, which can be reused in different transmission blocks,
• {ũ i } i∈D are assigned by random mappings 2 to approximate the target channel input distribution:
X |Y ) c are separately transmitted to the receiver with some reliable error-correcting code. In this paper, we refer {ũ i } i∈D to the almost deterministic bits since most of them are almost deterministic given the rest bits. It is shown in [16] and [32] that the rate of the shared almost deterministic bits in (H (N )
X |Y ) c vanishes as N goes large. Having receivedỹ 1:N and recovered the additionally transmitted bits, the receiver decodesũ 1:N with a successive cancellation (SC) decoder:
The rate of this scheme,
B. POLAR CODING FOR MULTIPLE ACCESS CHANNELS
In this subsection we recap the monotone chain rule expansion based MAC polarization method introduced in [28] and generalized to asymmetric channels in [35] . The achievable rate region of a binary-input discrete memoryless 2-user 2 In [32] it is shown that part of the bits in D can be replaced with deterministic mappings instead of random rules. However, since random rules are more friendly to analysis, we adopt random rules in this paper.
MAC P Y |X 1 X 2 (y|x 1 , x 2 ) is given by [36] 
and let S 1:2N = (S 1 , . . . , S 2N ) be a permutation of U 1:N 1 U 1:N 2 such that it preserves the relative order of elements of both U 1:N 1 and U 1:N 2 , called a monotone chain rule expansion.
Then a monotone chain rule expansion can be represented by a string b 2N 
called the path of the expansion. The mutual information between the receiver and two users can be expanded as
, and the rate of user j (j = 1, 2) is
. It is shown that arbitrary points on the dominant face can be achieved with expansions of type 0 i 1 N 0 N −i (0 ≤ i ≤ N ) given sufficiently large N [28] . It is also shown that H (S i |Y 1:N , S 1:i−1 ) (i ∈ [2N ]) polarizes to 0 or 1 as N goes to infinity.
Since the length of the expansion that achieves a target rate pair may not be long enough, we need to scale the path in order to polarize the MAC sufficiently. For any integer
which is a monotone chain rule for U 1:lN
It is shown in [28] that b 2N and lb 2N have the same rate pair. With this result, we can construct a polar code for the 2-user MAC using point-to-point polar codes.
Since X 1 and X 2 are independent, we have
Then we can partition indices of
and then apply the polar coding scheme introduced in the previous subsection. The receiver jointly decodes U 1:N 1 and U 1:N 2 with a successive cancellation decoder according to the permutation used. The following proposition shows that this scheme can achieve the whole achievable rate region of a 2-user MAC.
Proposition 1 [28] : Let P Y |X 1 X 2 (y|x 1 , x 2 ) be the transition probability of a binary-input memoryless 2-user MAC. Consider the transformation defined in (17) . Let N 0 = 2 n 0 for some n 0 ≥ 1 and fix a path b 2N 0 for U
Then, for any given δ > 0, as l goes to infinity, we have
As has been shown by Arıkan [28] , permutations of type
is sufficient to achieve the whole achievable rate region of a 2-user MAC. MAC polar codes of this type can be constructed using existing efficient construction methods for point-to-point polar codes [35] , such as [33] and [34] . Since S 1:i = U 1:i 1 and S N +i+1:2N = U i+1:N 1 , U 1:i 1 polarize in the same way as that in the equivalent point-topoint channel when user 2's signal is treated as noise, and U i+1:N 1 polarize in the same way as that in the equivalent point-to-point channel when user 2's signal is treated as side information. For user 2, the code construction of U 1:N 2 can be estimated using methods of [33] and [34] with some modifications by taking the side information of U 1:i 1 into account when calculating likelihood ratios of the synthesized channels. Thus, MAC polar codes of type 0 i 1 N 0 N −i can be constructed with complexity O(N ).
IV. POLAR CODING FOR THE TWO-WAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section we introduce details of our proposed scheme. Due to the full-duplex nature of the two-way wiretap channel, each participant's effective channel is modeled as a MAC. Since each legitimate user knows its own transmitted signal, he/she can treat it as side information in the encoding and decoding process.
A. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 1) POLARIZATION OF LEGITIMATE CHANNELS For a given P X 1 
Since two users' messages are independent, we have H (N )
For conventional two-way communications without secrecy requirement, the information bit sets of the two users are respectively defined as
Since such two polar codes can be seen as MAC polar codes designed for corner points, from (20) we have
To generate the final codeword (i.e., to do channel prefixing), one can transmitc 1:N j (j = 1, 2) through a virtual channel with transition probability P X j |C j , wherec 1:N j is the realization of C 1:N j in the encoding scheme. In practice, channel prefixing may not be done perfectly. In this paper, we consider X j and C j (j = 1, 2) as two correlated sources and use polar coding to do channel prefixing. Define
can be obtained as follows:
are filled with uniformly distributed random bits,
2) POLARIZATION OF THE EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL
Eve's effective channel is defined as W e (y e |c 1 , c 2 )
the achievable rate region of which is given by
For an arbitrary point
Then we can define the following polarized sets from Eve's point of view:
Since two users' messages are independent from each other, we have H
C j . Note that we do not assume how Eve decodes by using a specific permutation S 2N . The choice of S 2N only determines the secrecy rate allocation between the two users. We will show in the next subsection that our scheme satisfies the strong secrecy criterion whichever permutation we use.
3) POLAR CODING FOR THE TWO-WAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
Define the following index sets for Alice,
as illustrated in Fig. 2, and to Eve but unreliable to the Bob, which poses a problem to the code design. They should serve as frozen bits for Bob while being secured from Eve. A commonly adopted method to solve this problem is the chaining method [31] , which will be described in detail below. {ũ i } i∈D 1 are the almost deterministic bits to be generated by random mappings.
The key point of the assignment for bits in R b 1 and R b 2 is to find a way to ensure their randomness with respect to the eavesdropper and definiteness with respect to the legitimate users simultaneously. Suppose |I 1 | > |R b 1 | and |I 2 | > |R b 2 | (corresponding to the positive secrecy rate case). Choose a subset I b
Consider a series of m (m ≥ 1) transmission blocks.
2 ) in the (k + 1)th block in the sense that bits in them share the same value. In the kth block, Alice and Bob can decode I b 1 and I b 2 respectively while Eve can not, which will provide bit values for R b 1 and R b 2 in the (k + 1)th block and serve as frozen bits. To initiate the transmission, Alice and Bob should share two secret seed sequences of length |R b 1 | and |R b 2 | respectively. The seed rate of this scheme,
can be made arbitrarily small by choosing sufficiently large m. The chaining scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3 . Details of the encoding and decoding procedures are as follows. Encoding: In the 1st block, Alice encodes her message as follows:
• {ũ i 1 } i∈I a 1 carry uniformly distributed secret information bits,
carry uniformly distributed secret seed shared only between two legitimate users,
• {ũ i 1 } i∈F 1 are filled with uniformly distributed frozen bits (known by everyone, including Eve),
• {ũ i 1 } i∈D 1 are assigned by random mappings:
).
• The final codeword is generated as described in Section IV-A1.
) c are separately and secretly transmitted to Bob. In the kth
are assigned with the same value as {ũ i 1 } i∈I b 1 in the (k − 1)th block, and the rest bits are encoded in the same way as in the 1st block.
Bob encodes its message similarly by replacing subscript 1 by 2. Although our scheme requires separate secret communications between two users, we will show in the next subsection that the rate of them vanishes as the blocklength goes large. Also note that the frozen bits can be reused in different blocks since they only need to be uniformly distributed and can be known by Eve. We will prove that reusing them does not harm secrecy in the next subsection.
Decoding: Assume that Bob can recover
) c reliably (which is reasonable since these bits can be transmitted with very low rate so as to enhance reliability), he decodes Alice's message as follows:
In the 1st block,
in the (k − 1)th block, and the rest bits are decoded same as in the 1st block.
Alice decodes Bob's message similarly by swapping subscripts 1 and 2.
B. PERFORMANCE 1) TOTAL VARIATION DISTANCE
First, we bound the total variation distance between the target joint distribution P C 1 C 2 X 1 X 2 Y 1 Y 2 Y e and the induced distribution PC 1C2X1X2Ỹ1Ỹ2Ỹe by our encoding scheme. Since G N is an invertible mapping, by the chain rule for the Kullback-Leibler divergence we have
where (28) holds by our common message encoding scheme, (29) holds by the fact that information bits and frozen bits are uniformly distributed, and (30) holds by the definition of H (N )
Then by the chain rule for the Kullback-Leibler divergence we have D(P 
Similarly,
Then we have 
where (35) 
2) RELIABILITY Let P (k) e1 (N ) and P (k) e2 (N ) respectively be the block error probability of Bob's and Alice's decoder in the kth block. For k = [2, m], define the following error events for Bob:
where (·) k denotes random variables in the kth block, and U chaining 1 denotes the bits used for chaining. The first error event is caused by the variation between the target distribution and the induced one by our encoding scheme, while the second one is caused by incorrectly decoded chaining bits. Using optimal coupling [38, Lemma 3.6] we have
Denote δ a N = 4
≤ (k − 1)(δ a N + N δ N ) + P[(C 1:N 1 ) 1 = (C 1:N 1 ) 1 ], (41) where (40) holds from (39) , the error probability of source polar coding [6] , and the fact that P(E ch
, and (41) holds by induction. For k = 1, similar to the above analysis we have
Thus, the overall error probability of Bob in the m blocks can be upper bounded by 
where (46) holds because H (S c i |Y e,k ,S c 1 , . . . ,S c i−1 ) ≥ H (S c i |Y e,k ,S 1:c i −1 ). Note that the entropy here is calculated under the distribution induced by our encoding scheme. To estimate I (M k , E k ; Y e,k |F) correctly, let H P (S c i |Y 1:N e , S 1:c i −1 ) denote the entropy under the target (25) and (27) we have 
From (47) and (48) we have
Suppose Eve has perfect knowledge of the frozen bits. The information leakage of our scheme is then
where (50) and (51) hold due to the fact that
form two Markov chains conditioned on F.
By induction hypothesis we have
where I (E 0 ; Y e,0 |F) is Eve's knowledge about the secret seeds, which should be 0 in a secure coding scheme. From Lemma 1 we have
4) ACHIEVABLE RATE REGION
Theorem 1: The coding scheme described in Section IV-A achieves the whole secrecy rate region of the two-way wiretap channel defined in (8) under the strong secrecy criterion.
Proof: From the previous subsection we can see that the secrecy rate pair of our scheme is
From (23) we have
From (20) we have
Since H 
Thus, lim N →∞
Since (R S1 , R S2 ) is an arbitrary point on the dominant face of R S (P Y 1 Y 2 Y e |X 1 X 2 ), we can say that the whole secrecy rate region is achievable.
5) RATE OF SHARED RANDOMNESS
We further discuss the rate of shared randomness required in our scheme. As we have shown, the uniformly distributed frozen bits can be reused over blocks without sacrificing reliability or secrecy. In our scheme, we have assumed that each user uses the same frozen bits over m chained blocks. Then the rate of frozen bits is
Since |F 1 | + |F 2 | = O(N ), we can see that R F can be made arbitrarily small by choosing sufficiently large m. Besides, they can actually be generated without sacrificing any transmission rate. For example, all communicators (including the eavesdropper) can use the same pseudorandom generator (PRG) to produce the same pseudorandom frozen bits by inputing the same seed to the PRG, such as the current time.
The rate of the shared almost deterministic bits which need to be separately and secretly exchanged after each transmission block is
Similar to the point-to-point channel case introduced in Section III-A, we have lim
Recall from Section IV-A3 that the secret seed rate R seed can also be made arbitrarily small by increasing m. From the above we can conclude that the overall rate of shared randomness required in our scheme can be made negligible by using sufficiently long blocklength and sufficient number of chained blocks.
6) COMPLEXITY
Since the encoding complexity and decoding complexity of the monotone chain rule based MAC polar codes are the same as those of point-to-point polar codes, the encoding complexity and decoding complexity of our proposed scheme are both O(N log N ). As we have introduced in Section III-B, the MAC polar codes we adopt can be constructed with existing point-to-point polar code construction methods. Thus, the construction complexity of our proposed scheme is O(N ). Therefore, we can claim that our proposed scheme is low-complexity.
V. SPECIAL CASE: ACHIEVING WEAK SECRECY WITHIN A SINGLE TRANSMISSION BLOCK
In the traditional one-way wiretap channel, as has been shown in [12] and [13] , if the eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to the main channel, the reliable bit set of a polar code designed for the eavesdropper channel will be a subset of that for the main channel [7] , and the secrecy capacity can be achieved under the weak secrecy criterion within a single transmission block. In the two-way wiretap channel, a similar case also exists.
Definition 2: Let P 1 : X 1 ×X 2 → Y 1 and P 2 : X 1 ×X 2 → Y 2 be two discrete memoryless multiple access channels, then we say P 2 is degraded with respect to P 1 (denoted by P 1 P 2 ) if there exists a third channel P 3 : Y 1 → Y 2 such that P 2 (y 2 |x 1 , x 2 ) = y 1 ∈Y 1 P 1 (y 1 |x 1 , x 2 )P 3 (y 2 |y 1 ) for all (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 and y 2 ∈ Y 2 .
where L (N ) (26) , and L (N ) (21) and (22) . Proof: Since S 1:2N is a permutation of U 1:N 1 U 1:N 2 , we have
And since (C 1 , C 2 ) → (C 1 , X 2 ) → Y 1 forms a Markov chain, we have
If P Y 1 |C 1 ,C 2 P Y e |C 1 ,C 2 , we have
Thus,
From the definitions of the polarized sets we can see that L (N )
Similarly we can show that L (N )
In this special case, we partition indices of U 1:N 1 into four sets:
as illustrated in Fig. 4 . Similarly, indices of U 1:N 2 are partitioned into I 2 , F 2 , R 2 and D 2 . The coding scheme is then simple. I 1 and I 2 carry information bits, R 1 and R 2 are filled with random bits, F 1 and F 2 carry frozen bits, and D 1 and D 2 are determined with random mappings. Similar to the strong secrecy scheme, a vanishing fraction of the almost deterministic bits are secretly exchanged between Alice and Bob.
Theorem 2: If the eavesdropper channel is degraded with respect to both legitimate channels, the coding scheme described in this section achieves all points on the dominant face of the secrecy rate region of the two-way wiretap channel defined in (8) under the weak secrecy criterion.
Proof: Reliability: In the weak secrecy scheme, the total variation distance and the error probability can be analyzed similarly as the strong secrecy one (except that there is no chaining). Thus, (38) also holds, and
where δ a N = 4 √ log 2 √ N δ N . Secrecy: Since in this section we only consider a single transmission block, we drop the subscripts and superscripts for block numbers in notations used in Section IV-B3. Similar to (46), the information leakage can be upper bounded by
From (58) we have I j ∪ F j = H (N ) (61) and let H P (S i |Y 1:N e , S 1:i−1 ) denote the conditional entropy under the target distribution
Thus, the information leakage rate can be upper bounded by 
We can then use a similar analysis to the strong secrecy case and show that this scheme achieves all points on the dominant face of R S (P Y 1 Y 2 Y e |X 1 X 2 ). For conciseness we omit it here. Now we have finished the proof for Theorem 2.
VI. EXAMPLE: BINARY ERASURE CHANNELS
In this section, we present an example to show the performance of our scheme. For simplicity, all channels are assumed to be binary erasure MACs, defined as
and the channel inputs are assumed to be uniformly distributed. The erasure probabilities of Bob's observed channel
Eve's observed channel W e (Y 1 |X 1 X 2 ) are 1 = 0.2, 2 = 0.3 and e = 0.4 respectively. For the auxiliary random variables in (8), we consider C 1 = X 1 and C 2 = X 2 . In this case, the achievable rate region of the eavesdropper MAC is
Since each user knows its own transmitted message, two legitimate channels can be simplified to two BECs with erasure probabilities 1 and 2 respectively. Then the secrecy rate region of this channel is
In this example we use Bhattacharyya parameters instead of conditional entropy as the metric to construct polar codes, as Bhattacharyya parameters for BECs can be easily calculated by [5] 
). The Bhattacharyya parameter of a random variable pair (X , Y ) is defined as Z (X |Y ) = 2 y∈Y P Y (y) P X |Y (0|y)P X |Y (1|y).
The following proposition shows that the Bhattacharyya parameter and the conditional entropy polarize simultaneously.
Proposition 2 [6, Proposition 2] : Let (X , Y ) be an arbitrary pair of random variables over X × Y with X = {0, 1} and Y an arbitrary countable set. The following inequalities hold
Either both inequalities are strict or both hold with equality. For equality to hold, it is necessary and sufficient that X conditioned on Y is either deterministic or Ber( 1 2 ). For the eavesdropper MAC, we take a corner point of its achievable rate region, (0.6, 0.3), as an example. The secrecy rate pair in this case is (0.5, 0.1). The Bhattacharyya parameters in the corner point case can be easily calculated since the MAC can be split into two single-user channels. Let W e1 (Y e |X 1 ) be the channel from Alice to Eve when X 2 is known to Eve, and W e2 (Y e |X 2 ) the channel from Bob to Eve when X 1 is treated as noise. It is easy to verify that Bhattacharyya parameters for W e1 and W e2 are the same as those for W e1 (Y e |X 1 ).
In this example we choose m = 1 without loss of generality as the number of chained blocks is only a multiplier when estimating the information leakage and block error rate. Since all channels are symmetric and we have assumed C 1 = X 1 and C 2 = X 2 , from (29), (31) , (32) and their counterparts for Alice we know that the variation distance is 0. Once we are able to obtain the Bhattacharyya parameters for all synthesized channels, the upper bound for block error rate can be evaluated by [5] 
and that for the information leakage can be estimated by (46) and (67). The parameter δ N = 2 −N β (0 < β < 0.5) in the definitions of polarized sets plays an important role in the code design. The larger β is, the smaller L(N ) and P e (N ) will be for a given N . However, the secret sum rate will be smaller correspondingly. In this example, we choose several β values and compare their differences in performance. rate of our proposed scheme. The result meets our theoretical analysis that, as the code length increases, the information leakage and block error rate vanish while the secrecy sum rate approaches R s = 0.6.
From the results of Fig. 5 , 6 and 7 it may seem that our proposed scheme requires very large code length to achieve good performance. This is due to the fact that the estimated upper bounds using the Bhattacharyya parameters are quite loose (although it is sufficient to prove the achievability of our scheme). In fact, the finite length performance of polar codes can be improved significantly if more powerful decoding algorithms are used. This is also the reason why Fig. 5 and 6 show no decrease in information leakage and error probability for moderate code lengths.
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have introduced polar codes into the problem of coded cooperative jamming in the two-way wiretap channel, and proposed a strong secrecy-achieving scheme for the general case and a weak secrecy-achieving scheme for the degraded case. The monotone chain rule expansion based MAC polarization method is used to allocate different secrecy rates between two users. Although we only considered binary-input case in this paper, the result can be readily extended to arbitrary prime alphabet cases with the results of [16] and [40] . He has published 89 papers in IEEE journals and over 110 papers in IEEE conferences. He is an Editor of the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS, and the IEEE ACCESS. He is the Chair of the IEEE Vehicular Technology Society Shanghai Chapter. His interests cover multiple access, coded cooperation, and green heterogenous networks.
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